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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ORLO S. MA ,V, R. JOHN MAW, 
and VADEL T. MA,V, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
vs. 
YVEBER BASIN 'VATER CON-
SERVANCY DISTRICT, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
APPELLANTS' BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
No. 
10823 
This is an action brought to recover the fair market 
value of shooting privileges in the Ogden Duck Club 
which were terminated as a result of the construction 
of the 'Villard Bay Reservoir. 
1 
DISPOSITION IN LO,VER COURT 
This case now appears for the second time before 
this Court. On the first appeal this Court reversed the 
Judgment of the Second District Court whereby the 
plaintiffs' Complaint had been dismissed with preju. ' 
dice because the District Court concluded that a 1936 1 
"Right-of-'Vay Agreement" was not ambiguous on 
its face, and that certain duck club shooting privileges 
provided for in that agreement were only for the bene-
fit of the named sons of Annie C. Maw, who was one 
of the parties to the 1936 agreement ( 15 Utah 2d 271, 
391P.2d300). 
Upon remand, and at the final Pre-Trial hearing, 
the Second District Court ordered that the prayer for 
punitive damages set forth in plaintiffs' Amended Com-
plaint be stricken. 
At the trial of this matter on November 29 and 
30, 1966, the Court ruled that plaintiffs' issue that a 
third-party beneficiary contract existed be taken from 
the jury as a matter of law and further, that the inter-
pretative issue as to whether the 1936 Right-of-Way 
Agreement extended beyond the deaths of the four 
named sons of Annie C. Maw be likewise taken from 
the jury as a matter of law. 
Respective counsel stipulated (plaintiffs' counsel 
retaining his conditional objection to the Court's failure 
to submit to the jury the interpretative issue as to 
whether the 1936 Right-of-Way Agreement extended 
beyond the deaths of the four sons of Annie C. Maw) 
2 
that the value of the shooting privileges would be sub-
mitted to the jury as to George C. Maw only, and 
that if any of the other plaintiffs were entitled to judg-
ment a separate computation would thereafter be made, 
based upon the value of such shooting privileges to 
George C. Maw, by computing the life expectancies 
of such other plaintiffs and their respective age or ages 
as of April 7, 1958 (R. 28 & 38). 
Thereafter the jury returned a verdict of $2,040.00 
for the plaintiff George C. Maw and against the de-
fendant 'Veber Basin 'Vater Conservancy District. 
At a subsequent hearing the Court announced its 
final ruling that judgment would be awarded only as 
to plaintiff George C. Maw, and that it would deny 
recovery to each and all of the other plaintiffs. George 
C. Maw does not appeal since his action has been re-
solved and settled. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiffs seek reversal of the applicable rulings 
and orders entered in this action, and request that they 
be permitted to submit the issues-of punitive damage, 
third party beneficiary contract and interpretation of 
the 1936 Right-of-Way Agr.eement as to appellants-
to a jury for determination. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The relevant facts begin in 1936, at which time a 
widow by the name of Annie C. Maw and her four sons 
3 
lived in the farming community of Plain City, \Y eber 
County. :Mrs .. l\1aw and her four sons owned and op. 
erated in excess of 1,000 acres of farming and grazing 
land in the area north of Plain City, being partly in 
\Veber County and partly in Box Elder County. Tht 
particular grazing lands extended westerly into the 
marsh lands of the Great Salt Lake, where individuals 
from the city of Ogden had organized a club for the 
purpose of shooting ducks. 
This club, known as the Ogden Duck Club, recog-
nized that in order to utilize lands which it had under 
lease from the State of Utah, it would be well to secure 
from Mrs. Maw a written right-of-way so as to insure 
continued passage in the future across her lands in going 
to and from their clubhouse and duck hunting area. 
No other route was available. Accordingly, the Ogden 
Duck Club had its attorneys prepare a Right-of-\Vay 
Agreement providing for such passage and other rights. 
The 1936 Right-of-Way Agrement is set forth in its 
entirety in the Appendix of this brief. 
Mrs. Maw apparently made a bargain which proved 
to be very advantageous to her entire family. Not only 
were the shooting privileges enjoyed by her family 
non-assessable in that they were not required to pay 
the annual dues of the club, but it developed that the 
members of the Maw family were soon in social and 
business contact with the most elite professional and 
business leaders of th eOgden area. Their personal con-
tacts with Club members, together with the use of boats, 
clubhouse facilities, blinds and leased hunting grounds, 
4 
all contributed to making the shooting privileges rather 
raluable. 
In the course of time three of the sons of Annie 
1 C. ~law died, leaving at the time when the complaint 
was filed one son, George C. Maw, surviving. However, 
upon the death of the other three named sons, at least 
one of the sons of each was substituted in place of the 
respective fathers ( R. 39-pp. 8, 20 & 25). These 
1 grandsons of Annie C. l\1aw similarly used the duck 
club facilities and continued to shoot ducks and other-
wise partake of the club's facilities in place of their 
fathers. The appellants here, Orlo S. Maw, R. John 
~law and Vadel T. Maw, are the respective sons of 
Wilmer J. Maw, Rufus Maw and Gilbert E. Maw, 
three of the four sons of Annie C. Maw. The affected 
parties hereto construed the 1936 agreement as per-
mitting them to continue to use the facilities which their 
fathers had previously enjoyed. 
In about 1956, the Weber Basin Water Conserv-
ancy District, in conjunction with the United States 
Bureau of Reclamation, decided to construct a water 
storage reservoir to be known as the Willard Bay Res-
ervoir. This particular reservoir was planned to cover 
a substantial portion of the Maw land holdings and 
a portion of the leased grounds where the duck club 
had its clubhouse and shooting area. The road which 
the Ogden Duck Club had been using through the Maw 
properties was included in the land to be inundated. 
In effectuating its planned construction the 'Veber 
Basin 'Vater Conservancy District arranged to physic-
5 
ally move the duck club improvements about one mile 
west from their previous location. Also notified of the 
planned construction were Grace B. Maw and W. 
J olm .Maw and Sons, Inc., successors in interest to 
Annie C. Maw. 
"\Vhen the "\V eber Basin 'i\T ater Conservancy Dis-
trict and the United States Bureau of Reclamation were 
ready to purchase the lands for the Willard Bay proj-
ect, several members of each organization contacted 
Mr. Orlo ~law, one of the appellants, who was also at 
that time the president of W. John Maw and Sons, Inc., , 
for the purchase of the properties needed for the project i 
(R. 39-pp. 7 & 8). Orlo Maw informed the various I 
I 
individuals that his company would not consider selling \ 
the lands involved unless his uncle George, himself, 
1 
and his cousins were proteced as to their shooting privi· i 
leges in the Ogden Duck Club, either in that they would i 
I 
be paid for the privileges or that the privileges would 
not be disturbed in any way (R. 39-p. 7). 
Pursuant to the demands of Orlo Maw that the 
shooting rights of the Maw family be protected prior 
to the signing of any land purchase contract, Mr. E. J. 
Skeen, attorney for the respondent, prepared a rough 
draft of a letter dated July 5, I957 (R. 39-p. 10; PL 
Exh. B). Subsequently, five copies of the final draft 
of this same letter, all under the signature of E. J. 
Fjeldsted, Manager of the Weber Basin Water Con· 
servancy District, were received by Orlo Maw for 
distribution to the members of the Maw family whose 
rights were involved (R. 39-pp. II & I2). This letter 
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(Pl. Exh. C) made specific reference to the exclusion 
of the duck club shooting privileges from the proposed 
]and purchase contract in the following language: 
\VEBER BASIN DATER CONSERVANCY 
DISTRICT 
506 Kiesel Building 
Ogden, Utah 
July 5, 1957 
W. John Maw and Sons, Inc. 
Plain City 
Utah 
Gentlemen: 
Tract Nos. 95, 104, and 106 
Willard Dam and Reservoir 
,V. JOHN MAW AND SONS, INC. 
It is our understanding that you have executed a 
contract for the sale to the United States of tract Nos. 
95, 104 and 106, 'Villard Dam and Reservoir. 
This letter will assure you that the land purchase 
contract does not cover your other property interests in 
the 'Villard Bay Area, and specifically your state leases, 
water rights, easements, licenses, duck club shooting 
privileges, or lands other than those described in the 
land purchase contract. Any such property interests 
which will be required in the construction of the Dam 
or which will be damaged or destroyed will be appraised 
at a later date and an offer to purchase will be made. 
Yours very truly, 
s/d E. J. FJELDSTED 
E. J. FJELDSTED 
Manager 
7 
After receiving the written assurance above referred 
to, on July 15, 1957, Orio ~law executed a Land Pur. ' 
chase Contract (Pl. Exh. D) with the United State~ 1 
of America for the purchase of the properties ( R. 39_ 
p. 13), wherein it was stated among other things that 
1 
the right-of-way which gave the Maws claim to the duck 
club shooting privileges would not be included in the 
contract. Its terms provided as follows: 
"3a It is understood and agreed that the rights 
to be conveyed to the United States ... shall be 
free from lien or encumbrance except . . . and 
(ii) rights-of-way: for roads (including the 
right-of-way granted to the Ogden Duck Club 
across Tract 95) ... " 
Pursuant to the Land Purchase Contract, Grace 
B. Maw and W. John .Maw and Sons, Inc., executed 
a Warranty Deed (Pl. Exh. E) to the United States 
of America. That Warranty Deed, which was prepared 
by the grantee, was absolute on its face and made no 
reservation for the duck club right-of-way. 
For nearly a year thereafter the matter rested 
quietly until members of the Maw family began to 
demand that arrangements be made to protect their 
hunting privileges or that they be paid for them (R. 
39-p. 15). George C. Maw contacted Mr. J. Stuart 
McMaster, Field Solicitor of the United States De-
partment of Interior, regarding the shooting privileges 
which were to be appraised and purchased (R. 39-
p. 17). In response to his inquiry George C. Maw re· 
ceived from J. Stuart McMaster the following letter 
(PL Exh. F): 
8 
UNITED STATES 
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR 
OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR 
410 Newhouse Building 
IO Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City II, Utah 
September II, 1958 
l\Ir. George C. Maw 
Roy, Utah 
Dear Mr. Maw: 
Thank you for your letter of September 9, 1958 
regarding the Ogden Duck Club. 
You are advised that the matter has not been finally 
determined, but we are working on it. Please advise me 
if it would be possible for us to meet at a convenient 
time with the Maw people who are interested in the 
hunting privileges. 
I would appreciate hearing from you at your earli-
est convenience. 
Very truly yours, 
s/d J. Stuart McMaster 
J. STUART McMASTER 
Field Solicitor 
Copy to: Reg. Dir., BR, SLCU, attn: 4-400 
Project Manager, BR, Ogden, Utah 
In the meantime, and before court action was com-
menced, the Weber Basin District undertook construc-
tion activities, obliterated the old right-of-way which 
the Ogden Duck Club had been using, and created a 
new roadway over other portions of what had been the 
9 
.Maw properties, and which it had acquired. The Ogden 
Duck Club thereupon notified the l\Iaws that their duck 
club privileges had terminated. 
It later developed in the deposition of Mr. Eubank 
' secretary of the Ogden Duck Club, and after litigation 
had commenced, that the notice given to the Maws 
of the termination of their rights was given after the '! 
Ogden Duck Club had executed a Quit Claim Deed I 
to the l\Iaws to various lands in the area, which included 1
1 
the right-of-way reserved in the Land Purchase Con- , 
tract with the United States but not reserved in the 
Warranty Deed from the Maws to the United States . 
(Eubank Deposition P. 51). W. John Maw and Sons, ! 
I 
Inc., and Grace B. Maw were made grantees of the i 
particular Quit Claim Deed, without their consent or 
knowledge and without any prior discussion (Eubank 
Deposition p. 59). In fact, the Maw family obtained 
knowledge of the Quit Claim Deed quite some time 
after it had been executed and recorded at the request 
of the 'Veber Basin Water Conservancy District and 
court proceedings were in process. The deed was never 
accepted by the Maw family (Record on Appeal No. 
9950-pp. 19 & 20). 
This lawsuit arose when plaintiffs were refused 
payment for the value of their duck club shooting privi· 
leges and the Weber Basin Water Conservancy Dis-
trict refused to exercise its power of eminent domain 
to acquire the property interests held by the Maws. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE INTERPRETATIVE ISSUE AS TO 
WHETHER THE 1936 RIGHT - OF - \VAY 
AGREE~IENT EXTENDED BEYOND THE 
DEATHS OF THE FOUR SONS OF ANNIE 
C. :\IA \V SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUBMITTED 
TO THE JURY OR DECIDED AS A ~IATTER 
OF LA vV IN FAVOR OF PLAINTIFFS. 
POINT II 
THE ISSUE AS TO \VHETHER A THIRD-
P ARTY BENEFICIARY AGREEMENT EX-
ISTED FOR THE BENEFIT OF PLAIN-
TIFFS SHOULD HA VE BEEN SUBMITTED 
TO THE JURY OR DECIDED AS A :MATTER 
OF LAW IN FAVOR OF SAID PLAINTIFFS. 
POINT III 
APPELLANTS ARE ENTITLED TO RE-
COVER PUNITIVE DAMAGES AGAINST 
THE WEBER BASIN WATER CONSERV-
ANCY DISTRICT BECAUSE OF THE LAT-
TER'S FRAUDULENT, UNLAWFUL AND 
MALICIOUS TRESPASS UPON, AND DE-
STRUCTION OF, THEIR PR 0 PERT Y 
RIGHTS. 
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POINT I 
THE INTERPRETATIVE ISSUE AS TO 
WHETHER THE 1936 RIGHT-OF- 'VAY I 
AGREE.MENT EXTENDED BEYOND THE II 
DEATHS OF THE FOUR SONS OF ANNIE J 
C. l\'IA 'V SHOULD HA VE BEEN SUBMITTED 1 
TO THE JURY OR DECIDED AS A MATTER I 
I 
OF LAW IN FAVOR OF PLAINTIFFS. \ 
Upon the prior appeal of this identical case, this \ 
Court reversed the Second District Court in its inter- ! 
pretation of the 1936 Right-ofWay Agreement. In 
1 
its opinion of April 17, 1964, this Court affirmatively 
and directly held that the conclusion of the lower court, 
to the effect that the shooting privileges were only for 
the benefit of the four sons of Annie C. Maw, was I 
untenable as a matter of law (No. 9950-15 Utah 2d i 
271, 391 P. 2d 300). 
The written opinion of this Court on the prior 
appeal recites three conclusions of the district court. 
These three conclusions are ( R. 2-p. 2) : I 
I. That the 1936 "Right-of-Way Agreement" I 
was not ambiguous on its face, and that the \ 
shooting privileges were only for the benefit of 
the named sons of Annie C. Maw. 
2. Both parties (Ogden Duck Club and Weber 
Basin ':V ater Conservancy District) were ex-
cused from performance under the contract. 
3. That the ':V eber Basin Water Conservancy 
District was not liable to any of the appellants 
12 
) 
either by way of agreement, estoppel or other-
wise for loss of shooting privileges. 
t' , In commenting on the district court's conclusions, 
'.I this Court said (R. 2-p. 2): 
I I 
I 1 
I 
I 
I 
""Te agree with the court's conclusion that the 
Duck Club is not responsible for breach of con-
tract." (Giving reasons) . 
* * * 
"However, we cannot agree with the other con-
clusions of the court. As shown above, the Duck 
Club was granted a convenient right of way for 
access to its clubhouse and shooting grounds over 
Annie C. Maw's lands for so long as it main-
tained its clubhouse and shooting grounds for 
the purpose of shooting wild fowl. This right 
of access was to be exclusive for the use of the 
Club and its members, except that Annie C. 
Maw and her successors in interest were obli-
gated to keep a portion of this right-of-way in 
a travelable condition, for which service the sons 
of Annie C. l_\,faw named therein were granted 
certain nonassessible shooting privileges, which 
privileges any such named son could in any year 
designated a son of his own to enjoy such privi-
lege in his stead." (Emphasis added). 
At the subsequent trial of this matter the district 
court seemingly ignored the mandate of this Court. 
Again, the district court refused to permit the jury 
to make findings for the purpose of interpreting the 
1936 Rightof-Way Agreement in light of the evidence 
adduced at trial. In fact, the district court took the issue 
from the jury after commenting that " ... there's only 
13 
one side testifying to this pretty much" ( R. 39-p. 
57b). Nevertheless, the court ruled a,gainst that one 
side testifying as to the interpretation of the Right-of. 
'Vay Agreement (R. 38). 
The aforementioned rulings of the district court 
came about when the court ref used to submit Plaintiffs' 
Requested Special Interrogatories to the Jury (R. 23). 
Plaintiffs' interrogatory number one asked: 
I. Did the acts and conduct of the Maw family 
and the Ogden Duck Club after the deaths o.f 
Wilmer J. Maw, Rufus Maw and Gilbert Maw 
continue the 1936 agreement duck hunting pro-
visions to sons of the three deceased brothers? 
Answer·----------------------·-··· 1 
("Yes" or "no"\ 
In discussing this particular interrogatory the fol- ' 
lowing conversation took place (R. 39-p. 57a): 
THE COURT: And your question number 
I was that estoppel idea? 
MR. FULLER: No. That was party the 
estoppel, but mainly the interpretation of the 
'36 agrement placed upon it by the acts and con-
duct of the parties. It's an interpretative ques-
tion-
THE COURT (interposing) Let's see. The 
'36 agreement was between the Maws and the 
Duck Club. 
MR. SKEEN: It was between Annie Maw 
and the Duck Club. 
THE COURT: Yes. And you want a little 
activity here to interpret the contract? 
14 
1\-IR. I<,ULLER: That is correct, Your 
Honor. 
THE COURT: 'Vell, let me state it this way, 
though. Is there any conflict of evidence for the 
jury to find anyway? 
lVIR. FULLER: I don't think there's any 
conflict. 
THE COURT: Or just for the court? 
.MR. SKEEN: I don't think, if the court 
please, that there's any evidence that would jus-
tify conduct as construing an agreement. And 
we have had evidence that certain members of 
the Maw family hunted there, but-
THE COURT: (interposing) But it wouldn't 
be a question for the jury by this conduct. 
MR. SKEEN: That's right: I think it's purely 
a question for the court. 
MR. FULLER: 'Vell, the point we raised 
there was one of fact. If they were to-
THE COURT (interposing) 'Vell, there's 
only one side testifying to this pretty much. 
MR. FULLER: That's right. 
THE COURT: And so we wouldn't give it 
to the .fury anyway unless there was a conflict 
of facts. 
MR. FULLER: Well, we don't care on that 
,just so long as it's well understood that there's 
no conflict and the answer to that is yes, so that 
the court can take it from there. 
MR. SKEEN: Well, of course, we think the 
answer would be no. 
15 
MR. FULLER: Then we think it should go ' 
to the jury. I 
.Mr. SKEEN: I don't think it should go to · 
the jury, Your Honor, because I think it's ask-
ing the jury to consider-
THE COURT: (interposing) Well, after 
each of these-
MR. SKEEN: (continuing) interpreting the 
contract which is purely a matter for the court. 
And I think the evidence is very clear that any 
conduct that might have stemmed from courtesy 
shooting or anything else, there isn't any show-
ing that-
THE COURT: (interposing) Well, that's 
true of course. 
MR. SKEEN: And I think it's a question of 
interpretation, and I think the job on that is 
Your Honor's. 
As can be seen from the above question, it was the 
defendant's contention that " ... interpreting the con-
tract ... is purely a matter for the court ... " (R. 39 
-p. 58b). With this contention the court apparently 
agreed by saying: 
"Well, that's true of course." (R. 39-p. 57c). 
The interpretative issue was then taken from the jury 
as a matter of law (R. 39-p. 57). 
The respective functions of the judge and jury 
with regard to questions of law and fact are so ele-
mental as to warrant only brief discussion. In 53 Am. 
Jur., Trial, Sec. 266 (1945), the general rule is stated: 
16 
"\Vhere a contract is to be construed by its 
terms alone, it is the duty of the court to inter-
pret it; but where its meaning is obscure, and its 
construction depends upon other and extrinsic 
facts in connection with what is written, the ques-
tion of interpretation should be submitted to the 
jury, under proper instructions." 
Again in 53 Am. J ur., Trial, Sec. 270 ( 1945), we 
read: 
"Even though a written contract is ambiguous 
and extrinsic evidence on the matter of intention 
has been introduced, it is still within the province 
of the court to construe the writing where the 
extraneous matter is undisputed and unambigu-
ous. It is only where the extrinsic evidence is 
unconceded, conflicting, ambiguous, or such that 
a reasonable man might draw different infer-
ences therefrom that such evidence, with the 
written contract, should be submitted to the jury. 
But where the contract is not clear or is am-
biguous, and, even though the evidence is not 
conflicting, different reasonable conclusions are 
possible, the question is one for the jury." 
How the trial court can take an agreement which 
has been declared ambiguous by this Court, hear tes-
timony as to the course of performance of that agree-
ment which is adduced pretty much by one side (appel-
lants), and then direct a verdict for the respondent is 
difficult to see. There can be no question that the court 
could have lllore appropriately directed a verdict on 
the particular issue in favor ?f the appellants who tes-
tified at length as to the course of performance or 
practical construction of the agreement. 
17 
A look at the Partial Transcript of Proceedings 
will give credence to the court's comment that the ap. 
pellants adduced substantially all of the evidence before 
the court on the interpretation of the 1936 Right-of. , 
Way Agreement. All three appellants in this action 'i 
testified to the fact that the sons of the four sons of 1 
Annie C. Maw had used the facilities of the Ogden 
Duck Club subsequent to the deaths of their respecfae 
fathers, who were the sons of Annie C. Maw . 
. Mr. Orlo S. Maw, who was not even cross-examined, 
testified as fallows: 
Q. Now coming back to the time of your father's 
passing in 1953, did any member of your 
family-By that I mean, did you or any 
brother that you might have-continue to ~ 
use any of these shooting rights and privi· I 
leges in the Duck Club? 
A. My older brother went out on the lake and I 
shot ducks. 
Orlo's cousin, R. John Maw, testified as follows 
(R. 39-pp. 20 & 21): 
Q. Mr. Maw, who was your father? 
A. Rufus Maw. 
Q. Rufus Maw. And will you tell us 
pased away? 
A. 1949. 
* * * 
when he 
Q. And over the years and up until 1957 or '58, 
could you tell us generally the extent of the 
hunting that you did each year on their club 
facilities? 
18 
I 
I 
A. Oh, I think six or eight times a year probably. 
Q. And during the heaviest hunting-shooting 
portion of the season, how of ten would vou 
go out to hunt on the facilities? · 
A. '"'ell, I always tried to go once a week and 
twice if I could probably. 
Q. During the time that you were exercising this 
hunting activity, did you ever hunt with the 
regular members of the club? 
A. You mean go out in the boat with them? 
Q. Yes, that is what I mean. Did you use the 
facilities with them? 
A. (witness nods head up and down). 
Q. Could you tell us approximately when the 
hunting rights as to yourself terminated? 
A. \V ell, in '57 or '58. 
Another cousin, V ad el T. Maw, also testified that 
he used the facilities of the Ogden Duck Club both 
before and after the death of his father, Gilbert E. 
Maw, in 1954 (R. 39-p. 24). In referring to his father 
the testimony went as follows (R. 39-p. 25): 
Q. From the time he was first hospitalized and 
up to and including the year 1957, did you 
have occasion to use the Duck Club facilities 
for hunting purposes? 
A. I did. 
Q. Could you tell us generally from the time he 
was hospitalized how often you used those 
facilities? 
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A. Oh, approximately once a week. 
Q. 'Vould this be every year or alternating years 
or what kind of pattern? ' 
A. As far as I remember, I went out every year, 
yes. 
Q. And during a season, approximately how 
of ten did you use those facilities? 
A. 'Vell, once to twice a week. I went twice if 
it was possible. 
It is important to note at this point that this ap-
proved use of the club facilities subsequent to the deaths 
of the sons of Annie C. Maw transpired before any 
controversy had arisen. Furthermore, this practical 
construction continued for a period of some nine years 
after the death of Rufus Maw. 
Respondent in this action would have us believe 
that the use of the duck club facilities by the grand-
sons of Annie C. Maw was merely a gratuity or that 
it was associated with the work that some members of 
the Maw family did for the Ogden Duck Club. How· 
ever, the testimony of Vadel T. Maw makes it abun· 
dantly clear that any additional privileges which he 
or his brother might have had by reason of employment 
existed prior to his father's death (R. 39-p. 28). 
Q. Now during the time that you and your 
brother worked before the Ogden Duck Club, 
this was subsequent to your father's death or 
before his death? 
A. It would be before his death. 
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The respondent should not be heard at this point, 
after the controversy has arisen, to declare that all 
privileges were a mere gratuity. This declaration on 
the part of the respondent should not be allowed to 
prevail over the practical construction made by the 
appellants hereto at a point of time prior to the start 
of this controversy. Furthermore, the members of the 
Ogden Duck Club had full knowledge of the use of their 
facilities by the grandsons of Annie C. Maw (Record 
on Appeal No. 9950-R. 72-p. 40). This use was 
obviously acquiesced in by the Duck Club (R. 39-
P· 38). That the Ogden Duck Club acknowledg-ed an 
obligation to members of the l\!Iaw family is made ob-
vious by Mr. Eubank, secretary of the Ogden Duck 
Club, in his reference to the Quit Claim Deed (Eubank 
Deposition p. 60) : 
Q. That then was the basis for your termination 
of their privileges in the Club? 
A. That is correct . . . 
At this point it must be made clear that the appel-
lants do not contend that the practical construction 
herein sought was placed on the agreement by only the 
parties of one side; instead, there was a mutual and 
identical interpretation. This mutual interpretation is 
evidenced by the testimony of Mr. Eubank, and by 
correspondence received by the Maws from the def end-
ant. Mr. Eubank recognized the existence of the rights 
of the Maws up to the time the Quit Claim Deed was 
executed (Eubank Deposition p. 54) and he also 
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admitted that grandsons of Annie C. Maw used the 
duck shooting facilities after their fathers died with 1
1 
full concurrence of the Duck Club (Record on Appeal 11 
No. 9950-R. 72-p. 40). The letters from Mr. Fjeldsted I 
(Pl. Exh. C) made no reference to the shooting privi. I 
leges being held by only George C. Maw (the one sur- I 
viving son) ; rather, five executed letters were delivered 
to Orlo Maw for distribution to the members of the I 
.Maw family who claimed duck shooting rights (R. 39 \ 
-p. 12). Further, the McMaster letter (Pl. Exh. F) I 
referred to " ... the Maw people who are interested 
in the hunting privileges." It further stated: 
"We are interested in determining whether or 
not all of them are interested in retaining such 
hunting privileges." 
This interpretation of a contract by agreement by 
its course of performance of practical construction has 
been sanctioned by this Court in a substantial number 
of cases. However, the general rule is that the inter-
pretation of a contract cannot be aided with evidence 
from extraneous sources unless there is ambiguity or 
uncertainty. This is made clear in Ephriam Theatre 
Company v. Hawk, 7 Utah 2d 163, 321 P. 2d 221, 223 
(1958), where this Court said: 
"In considering the controversy here it is well 
to keep in mind the fundamental concepts in 
regard to contracts that their purpose is to re· 
duce to writing the conditions upon which the 
minds of the parties have met and to fix their 
rights and duties in respect t~ereto. _The i~te~t 
so expressed is to be found, 1f possible, w1thm 
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the four corners of the instrument itself in ac-
cordance with the ordinary accepted meaning 
of the words used. Unless there is ambiguity or 
uncertainty in the language so that the meaning 
is confused, or is susceptible of more than one 
meaning, there is no justification for interpre-
tation or explanation from extraneous sources." 
In light of the decision of this Court on the prior 
appeal, which decision held the 1936 Right-of-"\Vay 
Agreement to be ambiguous, it would seem that the 
circumstances of this case are appropriate for interpre-
tation by extraneous evidence as to the course of per-
formance or practical construction. Nevertheless, this 
Court has limited the rule of the Ephraim Theatre case 
by allowing evidence as to the course of performance 
to be used in establishing rights under an agreement 
which was not ambiguous. Under this latter rule, which 
was laid down in Bullough v. Sims, 16 Utah 2d 304, 
400 P. 2d 20 ( 1965) , there can be no doubt that the 
trial court should have allowed the jury to interpret 
the 1936 Agreement with the aid of the extraneous 
evidence introduced at trial. In the Bullough case this 
Court quoted the California Supreme Court at length 
on page 308: 
"This rule of practical construction is predi-
..:ated on the common seense concept that 'actions 
speak louder than words'. Words are frequently 
but an imperfect medium to convey thought and 
intention. "\Vhen the parties to a contract per-
form under it and demonstrate by their conduct 
that they knew what they were talking about 
the courts should enforce their interest. 
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"Appellants correctly claim that this doctrine 
of practical construction can only be applied 
when the contract is ambiguous, and cannot be 
used when the contract is unambiguous. That is 
undoubtedly a correct general statement of the 
law (citations omitted). But the question in. 
volved in such cases is ambiguous to whom~ 
Words frequently mean different things to dif. 
1 
fent people. Here the contracting parties dem-
onstrated by their actions that they knew what 
the words meant and were intended to mean. 
Thus, even if it be assumed that the words stand-
ing alone might mean one thing to the members 
of this court, where the parties have demonstrat-
ed by their actions and performance that to them 
the contract meant something quite different, 
the meaning and intent of the parties should be 
enforced. In such a situation the parties by their 
actions have created the 'ambiguity' required to 
bring the rule into operation. If this were not 
the rule the courts would be enforcing one con-
tract when both parties have demonstrated that 
they meant and intended the contract to be quite 
different." 
This Court has also spoken as to the nature of 
the facts necessary and sufficient to warrant a practical 
construction. In this regard this Court allows a uni-
lateral construction or a mutual construction, while 
naturally favoring the latter. This Court's specific view 
is to be found in Hodges Irr. Co. v. Swan Creek Canal 
Co., Ill Utah 405, 181 P. 2d 217, 220 (1947), wher~ 
this Court quoted with approval from 17 C.J.S., Con-
tracts, Sec. 325, as follows: 
"To warrant the court in according great 
weight to, or adopting, a practical construction 
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by the parties, it is necessary and sufficient that 
each party shall have placed the same construc-
tion on the contract. While the construction 
placed by one party on his own language in a 
contract is the highest evidence of his own in-
tention, the meaning of the contract cannot be 
established by the construction placed on it by 
one of the parties, unless such interpretation 
has been made to and relied on by the other 
party, or has been known to and acquiesced in 
by the other party, . . . " 
Not only was the meaning placed upon the agree-
ment by practical construction characterized by mu-
tuality, but the benefits and burdens under the agree-
ment were likewise of mutual import and duration. In 
other words, this Court should favor a construction of 
the agreement which would equalize the burdens and 
benefits as intended by the parties. The consideration 
conveyed by each party should be weighed against the 
consideration conveyed or promised by the other party in 
an attempt to arrive at a fair and equitable solution. 
In this regard the prior opinion of this Court said 
(R. 2-p. 2): 
" . . . This right of access was to be exclusive 
for the use of th~ Club and its members, except 
that Annie C. Maw and her successor in interest 
were obligated to keep a portion of this right-of-
way in a travelable condition, for which service 
the sons of Annie C. Maw named therein were 
granted certain nonassessible shooting privi-
leges, which privileges any such named son could 
in any year designate a son of his own to enjoy 
such privilege in his stead." (Emphasis added). 
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It would be patently unfair to require the success-
ors in interest of Anne C. J.Yiaw to carry the burden of 
maintaining the road in a travelable conditions while 
at the same time denying them of the correlative benefit 
of using the Duck Club facilities for hunting wild fowl. 
Furthermore, the consideration for the conveyance of 
the right-of-way easement by Annie C. Maw was " .. . 
$1.00 in hand paid and other valuable consideration .. . 
and the matters herein recited, . .. ,, (Emphasis added) 
(PL Exh. A). One matter therein recited was the 
privilege of using the Duck Club facilities. Since the 1 
right-of-way easement was not limited to the duration 
of the lives of the sons of Annie C. Maw, the shooting 
privileges should likewise not be so limited. 
It is the contention of the appellants hereto that 
they have a present and direct property interest under 
the terms of the 1936 Right-of-,Vay Agreement. The 
interest held by the appellants hereto is a vested interest 
for which they should be compensated. Appellants only 
ask that they be allowed to present their case to a jury 
with the understanding that a valuation will be made 
according to the stipulation of the parties as contained 
in the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (R. 
38). 
POINT II 
THE ISSUE AS TO 'VHETHER A THIRD· 
PARTY BENEFICIARY AGREEMENT EX· 
ISTED FOR THE BENEFIT OF PLAIN· 
TIFFS SHOULD HA VE BEEN SUBMITTED 
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TO THE JURY OR DECIDED AS A :MATTER 
OF LA\V IN FAVOR OF SAID PLAINTIFFS. 
It seems superfluous to discuss the existence of a 
yalid and binding contract in favor of the appellants 
hereto, since this Court has previously held that such 
an agreement existed (R. 2-p.2). However, because of 
the persistence of the respondent and the failure of 
the district court to follow the prior opinion in this 
matter, it becomes necessary to discuss briefly the 
rationale behind appellants' third-party beneficiary 
claim. 
Nevertheless, before spelling out appellants' claim, 
the appropriate language from the prior opinion of this 
Court is quoted as follows (R. 2-pp. 2 & 3): 
"The Court erred in dismissing the complaint 
with prejudice against the Weber Basin Water 
Conservancy District, for it is clear that in order 
to avoid condemnation proceedings it agreed to 
evaluate and pay for any shooting privileges if 
the construction of the Dam caused their loss. 
There can be no doubt that the activities in con-
nection with the construction of the Dam did 
cause such loss. Had not the purchase contract 
with the United States Government been ex-
ecuted, it would have been necessary to institute 
condemnation proceedings. In condemnation 
proceedings the value of the "shooting privi-
leges" would have been a proper element of 
damages to be considered by a jury in determin-
ing the value of the land taken. The Water 
Conservancy District merely agreed to do at a 
later date what it would have been compelled 
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to do sooner had the owners ref used to sell the 
lands for the project." (Emphasis added). 
During the trial of this matter Orlo Maw testified 
that he refused to sign a land purchase contract on 
behalf of \V. John .. l\law and Sons, Inc., unless he 
received written assurance from the \V eber Basin Water 
Conservancy District that the rights of the members of 
the J..VIaw family in the duck hunting privileges and the 
duck club right-of-way were protected and preserved 
or else compensated for (R. 39-pp. 7 & 10). Mr. Orlo : 
.l\la w testified as follows concerning this written assur-
ance which was introduced as Plaintiffs' Exhibit B 
(R. 39-p.10): 
Q. I show you what has been marked as Plain-
tiff's Exhibit B and I will ask you what it 
is, 1\-Ir. Maw? (hands to witness). 
A. This is a rough draft prepared by Mr. Skeen. 
Q. And that's a rough draft of what? 
A. Of the letter which I asked him to write pro· 
tecting our interests if we signed the contract 
with the United States Government, that 
these rights would be appraised at a later 
date. 
Subsequent to the receipt of the rough draft, .Mr. 
Maw received three executed originals and two executed 1 
copies of the same letter (Pl. Exh. C), for distribution 
to the interested members of the Maw family. The 
letter was prepared by E. J. Skeen, attorney for the 
Weber Basin District, and was signed by E. J. Fjeld-
sted, .Manager of the Weber Basin "\!Vater Conservancy 
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I 
I 
District. Notwithstanding the reference in the letter 
that the Land Purchase Contract had been executed, 
the date of the letter antedates the signing of the Land 
Purchase Contract by ten days. This is made clear by 
the following testimony of Orio Maw (R. 39-pp. 11 
& 13): 
Q. I next show you what has been marked as 
Plaintiff's Exhibit C which contains five sep-
arate items clipped together with a staple. 
Could you tell us what these are? (hands to 
witness) 
A. These are letters prepared by Mr. E. J. 
Skeen and signed by E. J. Fjeldsted for the 
protection of our shooting privileges and 
other rights which might have been damaged 
or destroyed in the purchase of the land. 
Q. And does the language of those letters sub-
stantially conform to the language of the 
preceding exhibit? 
A. I believe it's word for word. 
Q. Now are all of those letters signed by Mr. 
Fjeldstd? 
A. They are. 
Q. And approximately when did you receive 
those letters ? 
A. I would have received them before July 15th. 
Q. And the letter itself is dated July what? 
A. July 5th. 
• • • 
Q. I show you what has been marked Exhibit 
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D and ask you to identify it and tell us what 
it is? (hands to witness) . 
A. This is a land purchase contract by the United 
States Department of Interior, Bureau of 
Reclamation, land purchased from W. John 
lVIaw & Sons, Inc. And the contract was made 
the 15th of July, 1957. 
It is submitted that Orlo lVIaw, through John W. 
lVIaw and Sons, Inc., created a binding and valid third. 
party beneficiary contract in favor of the appellants 
hereto, relating to the duck club shooting privileges. 
The We her Ilasin Water Conservancy District received 
the benefits of this agreement and acknowledged the 
existence of the agreement in the following language 
(Pl. Exh. C) : 
"This letter will assure you that the land pur· 
chase contract does not cover your other prop-
erty interests in the Willard Bay Area, and spe· 
cifically your state leases, water rights, ease-
ments, licenses, duck club shooting privileges, 
or lands other than those described in the land 
purchase contract. Any such property interests 
which will be required in the construction of 
the Dam or which will be damaged or destroyed 
will be appraised at a later date and an offer 
to purchase will be made." 
The existence of this agreement for the benefit of 
members of the Maw family was evidenced by the fact 
that the duck club right-of-way was expressly reserved 
from the Land Purchase Contract (Pl. Exh. D) which 
was signed on July 15, 1957. Furthermore, the letter 
from J. Stuart McMaster (Pl. Exh. F), dated Sep· 
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tember 11, 1958, recognized the hunting privileges of 
the .Maw people. 
'fhe cases in Utah clearly recognize that one person 
can make on behalf of another person a contract which 
is enforceable by the beneficiary. The contract can be 
founded upon a creditor or a donee relationship, so 
long as the benefit is direct and not merely incidental. 
This has been made clear in Kelly v. Richards, 95 Utah 
560, 83 P. 2d. 731, 129 A.L.R. 164 (1938), where this 
Court said: 
"The rule of allowing the third party bene-
ficiary to recover is recognized now in America 
because it is reasonable and is not merely accept-
able as a flat rule of law. It is just and expedient 
to allow the person for whose benefit the contract 
is made to enforce it against the person whose 
duty is is to pay. However, an incidental bene-
ficiary has no rights under the contract. Robins 
Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint, 275 U. S. 
303 48 S. Ct. 134, 72 L ed 290 and German 
Alliance Ins. Co. v. Homewater Supply Co., 
226 U. S. 220, 33 S. Ct. 32, 57 L ed 195, 42 
LRA (NS) 1000, are to the effect that before 
a third party can sue for. a breach of a contract 
to which he was not a party he must show that 
the contract was intended to benefit him directly. 
The terms of the agreement and the facts and 
circumstances that surround its making can be 
examined to determine whether the supposed 
beneficiary was in fact intended to be such, ... " 
* * * 
"A stranger may benefit by a contract if prom-
ises are made where the promise has no pecuniary 
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interest in the performance of the contract, his 
object being to enter into it for the benefit of 
such stranger, or where the promisee seeks in-
directly to discharge an obligation of his own 
to the stranger by securing from the promisor 
a promise to pay such person. Vol. 12, American 
Jurisprudence, Contracts, Section 283." 
That no privity is required between the promisee 
and the third parties is made clear by the following lan-
guage from Walker Bank & Trust Company v. First 
Security Corporation, 9 Utah 2d 215, 341, P.2d 944, 
945 (1959): 
"It is often stated that privity of contract is 
a prerequisite to holding one liable for breach 
of a duty thereunder. But it is also recognized 
that there are duties to others than the immediate 
parties, where from the nature of the contract, 
it is plainly evident to the promissor (sic) that 
the contract is for the benefit of third persons 
and that a failure to discharge his duty would 
adversely affect them." 
This Court has gone beyond the holding that no 
privity need exist and has held that a third-party bene-
ficiary contract is valid, binding and enforceable at the 
instance and in the name of the beneficiary albeit made 
without the knowledge of the beneficiary. Brown v. 
Markland, 16 Utah 360, 52 Pac. 597 ( 1898). Further· 
more where the beneficiaries are so described as to be 
ascertainable, it is not necessary that they be named 
in the contract in order to recover thereon. Smith v. 
Bowman, 32 Utah 33, 88 Pac. 687 (1907); 17 Am. 
Jur. 2d, Contracts, Sec. 313 (1964). 
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It is elemental that the contract between the 
promisee and promisor must possess the necessary 
elements to make it a binding obligation to enable a 
third person, for whose benefit the promise was made, 
to sue upon it. More specifically, the contract must be 
based upon consideration. 
The consideration for the agreement benefitting 
the appellants hereto was furnished by the signing of 
the Land Purchase Contract by Orlo Maw, as president 
of ,V. John Maw and Sons, Inc., and by his forbear-
ance from necessitating a condemnation proceeding by 
the "\V eber Basin Water Conservancy District. The 
facts are undisputed that Orlo Maw would not have 
signed the Land Purchase Contract, but would have 
forced a condemnation action, but for the third-party 
promise by respondent (R. 39-pp. 7, 13 & 14). This 
Court so held in its prior opinion when, in reference to 
the Weber Basin Water Conservancy District, it said 
(R. 2-p. 2): 
" ... For it is clear that in order to avoid 
condemnation proceedings it agreed to evaluate 
and pay for any shooting privileges ... " 
That this forbearance and signing constitutes sufficient 
consideration is reinforced by the general rule from 
17 Am. Jur. 2d, Contracts, Sec. ll6 (1964): 
"Clearly f orebearance upon request to prose-
cute a well-founded claim is sufficient considera-
tion for a promise. On the other hand, most 
courts have reached the opposite conclusion with 
regard to the question whether forbearance to 
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sue on an unfounded claim will support a prom. 
ise given therefor, either by the alleged debtor 
or by a third person. It has been declared that 
a promise in consideration of forbearance is not 
binding if there was originally no right or cause 
of action or if the claim threatened to be enforced 
was invalid and worthless, groundless or un-
founded, or not even doubtful, colorable, or 
plausible, or if no claim was ever made or as-
serted ... " 
At this juncture it should be pointed out that, 
even if some doubt could have existed as to whether 
or not the lVIaws of the second generation, i.e., the 
grandsons o fAnnie C. Maw, were entitled to the duck 
club shooting privileges, that doubt was resolved and 
a new contractual arrangement was entered into by 
the Weber Basin Water Conservancy District in the 
form of a third-party beneficiary contract. This is so 
because W. John Maw and Sons, Inc., gave up its 
rights to litigate the matter of compensation in a com! 
of law in exchange for the recognition and protection 
of the duck shooting privileges in the Ogden Duck 
Club. Although appellants certainly do not concede 
that the 1936 Right-of-Way Agreement would not 
extend to and benefit the grandsons of Annie C. Maw, 
they do feel that a valid and binding third-party bene-
ficiary contract exists in favor of the said grandsons 
as further support for their claim to recover. 
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POINT III 
APPELLANTS ARE ENTITLED TO RE-
COVER PUNITIVE DAMAGES AGAINST 
THE WEBER BASIN WATER CONSERV-
ANCY DISTRICT BECAUSE OF THE LAT-
TER'S FRAUDULENT, UNLAWFUL AND 
MALICIOUS TRESPASS UPON, AND DE-
STRUCTION OF, THEIR PR 0 PERT Y 
RIGHTS. 
At the final Pre-Trial hearing, on November 21, 
1966, the district court announced its decision and 
ruling that the prayer for punitive damages set forth 
in plaintiffs' Amended Complaint would be stricken 
and over-ruled (R. 28-p. l). This action of the district 
court was taken prior to the introduction of any testi-
mony regarding plaintiffs' claim to punitive damages. 
The action taken by the lower court is also herein con-
tended to be an invasion of the province of the jury. 
This Court has ruled on more than one occasion 
that the amount of punitive damages which can justly 
and properly be awarded and whether such damages 
should be awarded are properly matters for the sound 
discretion of the jury. Evans v. Gaisford, 122 Utah 156 
247 P. 2d 43 (1952); Wilson v. Oldroyd, l Utah 2d 
362, 267 P. 2d 759 (1954); Po:-vers v. Taylor, 14 Utah 
2d 152, 379 P.2d 380 (1963). In the Wi"lson case this 
court said on page 766: 
"Just as with compensatory damages, it is 
peculiarly within the province of the jury to de-
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termine whether exemplary damages should ht 
awarded." 
The judge obviously has some discretion in submitting 
the prayer for punitive damages to the jury; however 
it is submitted that on the facts of this case there exists 
sufficient basis and reason for the assessment of puni. 
tive or exemplary damages. A look at the relevant facts 
will make this evident. 
On the 7th day of April, 1958, the Ogden Duck 
Club executed a Quit Claim Deed showing W. John 
Maw and Sons, Inc., and Grace B. Maw as the grantee1 
(Eubank deposition p. 51). The Quit Claim Deed. 
which was Plaintiffs' Exhibit B under the offer of 
proof in the prior appeal, described all of the land 
which had previously been transferred under W arrant1· 
Deed (PL Exh. E) from W. John Maw and Sons, 
Inc., and Grace B. Maw to the United States of 
America, inclu,ding the right-of-way to the duck club 
facilities which had been conveyed to the Ogden Duck 
Club in the 1936 Right-of-Way Agreement. 
All of this appears rather innocuous until additional 
facts are known. First, the Warranty Deed was absolutt 
on its face, containing no reservation for the duck clul 
right-of-way. Second, the existence of the right-of-wa~ 
in the duck club was necessary for the continuation o 
the appellants' shooting rights, or, as said by this Cour 
in its prior opinion, " ... the right-of-way was th 
subject matter of the agreement upon which appellant 
shooting privileges depended, ... " (R. 2-p. 2). Thir1 
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the Quit Claim Deed was executed and recorded without 
tlzc knowledge of the grantee, and without having been 
dclirered to, or accepted by, the grantee (Eubank Dep-
osition p. 59) . 
A further look at the deposition of .Mr. Eubank, 
Ogden Duck Club Secretary, gives the ostensible reason 
for the execution and recording of the Quit Claim Deed. 
Q. What was the occasion for this deed being 
prepared? In other words, how did it come 
about that this became necessary, do you 
know? 
A. 'V ell, I understood it was to clear the title 
to that ground out there so the Maws could 
get the settlement. That's all I know. 
Q. 'Vho prepared the document, do you know? 
A. I assume the Weber Basin Conservancy Dis-
trict did. I don't recall where it came from. 
I don't know where it came from, to be hon-
est with you. 
MR. SKEEN: It was prepared by the Bu-
reau of Reclamation. 
{Eubank deposition p. 55) 
As to the information apparently received by Mr. 
Eubank to the effect that the Quit Claim Deed had 
to be secured so that the Maws could get their payment 
t' for the lands involved, someone apparently seriously 
t J misinformed Mr. Eubank since the Quit Claim Deed 
e 1 issued by the Ogden Duck Club was dated April 7, 
1958, almost one year after the Land Purchase Con-
tract of July 15, 1957. The someone who misinformed 
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~Ir. Enbank was undoubtedly one of those same pers0ib 
who prepared or recorded the particular deed. It 
1
, 
submitted that the respondent hereto was the real parh 
in securing the execution of the deed. In fact, the Qu;t · 
Claim Deed was recorded at the request of 'Villia1L
1 
H. \Vikox, who was at that time an employee of thq 
\.Veber Basin \Vater Conservancy District. ' 
I 
A closer look at the deposition of Mr. Eubanl[ 
gives the real reason for the execution of the Quit Clain:i 
D~d. I 
I 
A. No, we don't feel we have had anything in.I 
volve? in i~, a~d we felt that by the issuance! 
of this qmtcla1m deed to the Maws whicl1 
covered all of that country out there, thatj 
it certainly abrogated anything that we would I 
have in connection with the lane which m
1 
couldn't use anyway because it had been 
closed off by the Government. \:Ve couldn't 
get across it. We couldn't get through it. We 
couldn't go across the ditch. We had to go 
around on the Government road. \.Ve did 
feel, and do feel to this date, by the execution 
of this quitclaim deed which was executed 
by the Club which made it possible for the 
.Maws to obtain their settlement from the 
United States Government on all their prop· 
erty that they had out there, that it abrogated 
anything that we had. 
(Eubank deposition-p. 54' 
As can be seen, the Weber Basin Water Con· 
servancy District sought to destroy the shooting privi· 
leges of the members of the Maw family by itself 
executing and recording the Quit Claim Deed because 
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jt knew full well that the Maws would not accept or 
record the deed which was in derogation of their shoot-
ing privileges. In so acting to destroy the property 
interests of the Maws, the Weber Basin District relied 
upon the doctrine of after-acquired title, or estoppel 
by deed. That doctrine was relied upon since Grace 
B, Maw and W. John Maw and Sons, Inc., had pre-
riously executed and delivered to the United States a 
\V arranty Deed (PL Exh. E) which described the 
same property as that described in the Quit Claim 
Deed, including the duck club right-of-way area upon 
which appellants' shooting privileges depended. If the 
Weber Basin District had not had the deprivation of 
the appellants' shooting priviliges in mind, it could have 
had the deed executed directly to the respondent or 
to the United States of America. 
It is the contention of the appellants that the 
obtaining of the Quit Claim Deed from the Ogden 
Duck Club and the recording of same, without the 
knowledge of the appellants or W. John Maw and Sons, 
Inc., and Grace B. Maw, is unlawful, fraudulent and 
malicious. Such are hardly the actions of a part.y acting 
in good faith and in the honest belief that its acts are 
lawful. Bear in mind that these acts were instigated 
by attorneys who should know the requirements of 
delivery and acceptap.ce. Any effort to circumvent 
these requirements at the expense of the grantee 
amounts to nothing less than a fraud. 
It is inconceivable that the respondent acted in 
good faith or in an honest belief as to the lawfulness of 
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its acts so as to come within the language of Calho
11 
v. Universal Credit Co., 106 Utah 166, 146 P. 2d 28J 
288 (1944), where this Court said: 
"The party must know that the act is wrongf
11 
and must do it intentionally without just ca~1. 
or excuse. If he acts in good faith and in th 
honest belief that his act is lawful, he is no 
liable for punitive damages even though he ma1 
be mistaken as to the legality of his act." · 
Furthermore, it is inconceivable how the respondem 
could appropriate the property rights of the appellanti 
and effectuate a continuing trespass without realizini 
that it was acting without the law. This trespass ha1 
continued without compensation despite the prior man· 
date of this Court that '' . . . ( t) here can be no doub! 
that the activities in connection with the construcfo 
of the Dam did cause such loss" ( R. 2-p. 3). The 
appellants have suffered an actual loss because of the 
respondent's taking of their property rights withoul 
the exercise by the respondent of its power of eminenl 
domain. 
At this juncture it should be made clear that th~ 
lawsuit involves more than a determination of the re· 
spective rights of the parties under the third-par~· 
beneficiary contract. This lawsuit is also an inverse 
condemnation action to obtain just compensation for 
the property rights taken by the respondent. This 
lawsuit has been made necessary by the respondent') 
failure to exercise its power of eminent domain If 
acqmrmg the property rights of the appellants. 
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Nevertheless, the Supreme Court of Utah and the 
'.: appellate courts of other states have held that punitive 
1 damages are appropriate in actions on contracts and 
I d . . · in inverse con emnahon actions. 
The general rule with regard to the allowance of 
punitive damages in actions for breach of contract is 
~· given in 22 Am. Jur. 2d, Darnages, Sec. 245 (1965): 
"As a general rule, damages for breach of 
contract are limited to the pecuniary loss sus-
tained. That is to say, exemplary damages are 
not ordinarily or as a rule, recoverable in actions 
for breach of contract. This rule does not obtain, 
however, in those exceptional cases where the 
breach amounts to an independent, wilful tort, 
in which event exemplary damages ipay be re-
covered under proper allegations of malice, 
wantonness, or oppression . . . " 
It cannot be gainsaid that a trespass is not an inde-
1 pendent tort, and it cannot be denied that the respond-
ent has trespassed upon and destroyed the property 
rights of the respondents. With regard to punitive 
damages for trespass and as to the irrelevance of the 
characterization of the wrongful act, this Court has 
spoken in Powers v. Taylor, 14 Utah 2d 152, 155, 379 
P. 2d 380 (1963): 
"It is true that punitive damages are usually 
associated with other types of tortious injury. 
But under proper circumstances they may be 
allowed in cases of trespass. Whether such dam-
ages are awardab1e is not dependent upon the 
classification of the wrongful act, nor upon the 
nature of the injury, but upon the manner and 
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intent with which it is done. If the wrongful a 
by whic~ _one injuries another is ~one wilft1J; 
and mahc10usly our law allows the imposition t 
punitive damages as a punishment to the lk 
fen<lant for such conduct and as a warning: 
him and others against it." ' 
The Powers case involved an action for damagt,I 
caused by the repeated trespass of defendant's horstli 
The plaintiff recovered $1,000 compensatory damage,ll 
and $1,500 exemplary damages. : 
I 
In another Utah case this Court allowed punitir,I 
damages for the destruction of a property right. Tm 1 
occurred in Falkenburg v. Neff, 72 Utah 258, 269 Par
1 
1008 ( 1928), where the defendant destroyed a dallij 
which plaintiff had built to divert water. It is interest.I 
ing to note of the Falkenburg case that the defendarn\ 
had a prior application for appropriation of the wate\ 
involved, but had no immediate use for such water. Tht: 
Falkenburg case follows explicitly the general rule a1i, 
stated in 22 Am. Jur. 2d, Damages, Sec. 243 (1965) I 
"Thus, where such circumstances or ingred1·I 
ents are properly established as a predicate fnri 
the award of exemplary damages, such damage1 , 
may be recoverable in actions for personal ir" 
juries received in consequence of tortious acts.' 
in actioM for in.Juries to, or for the wrongfu:' 
tald,ng or destruction of property, ... " (Em·! 
phasis added) . 
In the case at bar the respondent has wrongfulh 
taken and destroyed the property interests of the appei· 
lants. The respondent's failure to take this proper~ 
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1 under its power of eminent domain as this Court said 
L would be necessary, has necessitated this inverse con-
,,. demnation action by the respondents. 
~· 1' 
No case has been found where the general rule has 
been laid down that punitive damages are inappropriate 
to inverse condemnation actions. The denial of punitive 
~ 1 damages in those inverse condemnation cases found 
by this writer, where such damages were sought, has 
been based upon the failure of the plaintiff to plead 
or establish some requisite or ingredient. In Bridges 
v. Ala.ska Housing Authority, 375 P. 2d 696 (Alaska 
1962), the plaintiff was denied exemplary damages 
i in an inverse condemnation case because he had not 
~,I established wilful, outrageous, wanton, malicious or 
I 
: 1 
reekless conduct. Similarly, in Southwestern Gas & 
Electric Co. v. Patterson, 20 S.W. 2d 636 (Ark. 1929), 
no showing of bad faith could be made since the con-
demning agency acted under a void order. In Van 
11 Leuven v. Akers Motor Lines, Inc., 135 S. E. 2d 640 
/ (N. C., 1964), the plaintiff failed to disclose a factual 
.1 basis for punitive damages in his pleadings. 
I 
I 
However, the courts have clearly recognized the 
: right to recover punitive damages in inverse condem-
nation cases. In Pittsburgh, C., C. & St. L. R. Co. v. 
1 
Sedwick, 124 N. E. 512 (Ind. 1919), the Supreme 
i Court of Indiana allowed punitive damages against 
a railroad because it continued in possession after the 
expiration of a lease and refused to vacate the premises 
of the plaintiff even after an injunction had been issued. 
The court said on page 514 : 
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"The court has no hesitation in saying th, 
such conduct was reprehensible, and, if tlii 
amount recovered should contain an element :J' 
exemplary damages, appellant may not con
1
, 
plain. Thereby appellant became a trespasser: 
occupying said real estate wholly without rig!ri 
and continued as such until the time of the trw:
1 
and even yet so continues. There could be rn 1
1 
lawful appropriation of such real estate whi!,: 
appellant so occupied it as a trespasser, and.\ 
as appears both by the pleadings and the eni 
dence, no lawful steps were taken for the pur\· 
pose of appropriating said real estate." . 
I 
I 
In Rider v. York Haven Water & Power Com-
pany, 255 Pa. 196, 199, 99 Atl. 798 (1916), a riparia11i 
owner brought an inverse condemnation action for 
damages on account of the diversion of water from it, 
natural channel. In affirming the trial court in ill 
award of punitive damages, the Supreme Court ol 
Pennsylvania said: 
"The conduct of defendant, including con· 
structing and maintaining the dam across the 
river without claim or semblance of authority. 
the disclaiming in the equity suit any intention · 
of appropriating the water by right of eminent, 
domain and the neglect to remove such dam fa: 
several months after this court had affirmed the 
decree ordering its removal, tended to show n i 
careless and reckless disregard of plaintiffs ! 
rights and made the question of punitive dam· · 
ages one proper for the consideration of the 
jury, and the amount allowed as such was not 
out of proportion to the actual damages." 
These latter two cases have a striking resemblance 
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to the case at bar. In this case respondent has, during 
the last six years, directed a steady stream of motions 
:il the lower court, aimed against submitting this matter 
to a trial on the merits where all of the evidence could 
be introduced and weighed. Even though the Supreme 
Court of the State of Utah has once ruled on this 
matter, the respondent has taken up the same proce-
dure where it left off before the appeal, with even 
Jreatcr persistence and diligence. Its efforts to appro-
priate the duck shooting rights of the appellants with-
out exercising. its power of eminent domain stand out 
remarkably. Likewise, its qisregard of, and its refusal 
to consider, the prior opinion of this Court cannot be 
condoned. 
Taken as a whole the acts and conduct of the 
respondent evidence a conscious disregard of the rights 
of the appellants and a reckless indifference to conse-
quence. This conduct on the part of the respondent 
is sufficient to warrant the introduction before a Jury 
of evidence regarding punitive damages. 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that the interpreta-
tive issue as to whether the 1936 Right-of-Way Agree-
ment extended beyond the deaths of the four sons of 
Annie C. Maw, and the issue as to whether a third-
party beneficiary agreement was formed for the benefit 
of plaintiffs, should have been submitted to the jury 
or decided as a matter of law in favor of said plain-
45 
tiffs. This action sought by the plaintiffs anu ap_pc11o.~' 
is called for by the evidence adduced at trial and 1
11 
the prior opinion of this Court. Furthermore, the ac: 
and conduct of the respondents have been characterizer' 
by fraud and a reckless indifference to the interests i 
others so as to warrant the imposition of exemp!a11 f 
damages. I 
Respectfully submitted, 
GLEN E. FULLER and 
ORV AL C. HARRISOX . 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs-
Appellants 
15 East 4th South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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APPENDIX 
(i) 
RIGHT-OF-WAY AGREEMENT 
THIS AGREE1\1ENT made between ANNIE 
C. l\IA '"T of Plain City, Weber County, Utah, Gran tor, 
and OGDEN DUCK CLUB, a Utah corporation, and 
its members, Grantees. 
WITNESSETH: 
'Vhereas, Grantor is owner of lands m Sections 
, 20-17-18, Township 7 North, Range 2 West, Salt Lake 
I jferidian, as now appears of record in the offices of 
I the County Recorders of Weber and Box Elder Coun-
1 ties, State of Utah; and 
'Vhereas, Grantees and their predecessors in 
interest are now, and have been, using said lands for 
many years for right-of-way purposes; 
Now therefore, in consideration of $1.00 in hand 
paid and other valuable consideration, receipt of which 
is hereby acknowledged and the matters herein recited, 
Grantor does hereby give and grant unto Grantees and 
their successors in interest a convenient right-of-way 
over and across said lands for the purpose of going ti: 
and from the Club House owned by Grantees in Sec-
tion 12, Township 7 North, Range 3 'Vest, Salt Lah 
.Meridian, and the shooting grounds of Grantee lyillu 1 
North of the above described lands and other lanu
1 
now owned by Grantor, and to construct and maintaii.: 
a ditch, or ditches, at expense of Grantees, in said Sec-
1 
tion 18, Township 7 North, Range 2 \Vest, Salt Lakt I 
:Meridian, for the purpose of conducting water thereon,· 
over, and to said Club House and grounds of said 
Grantees. This grant shall be exclusive to Grantees a., 
to the purposes herein expressed except as to Grantor 
and the members of her family hereinafter mentioned .: 
so long as Grantees and any successors shall maintain :. 
said Club House and shooting grounds for the purpose ' 
of shooting wild fowl. 
In consideration of non-assessable shooting priri-
leges on said shooting grounds of Grantees on days '. 
excepting the opening day, Saturdays, Sundays, and j 
holidays, to be enjoyed by, and hereby granted to. , 
the sons of Gran tor named as follows, to-wit: ' 
'Vilmer J. :Maw, Rufus J. Maw, Gilbert Maw, and: 
George Maw, Grantor agrees to maintain in a travel· 
able condition the road which is a part of the right-of-
way herein granted to Grantees, now existing in said 
Section 20, Township 7 North, Range 2 West, Salt 
Lake :Meridian along the North rod of the East half 
of said section; provided that in any year the said 
'Vilmer J. l\'.Iaw, Rufus Maw, Gilbert l\iaw, and George 
11 
\law may designate one son for each thereof to shoot 
:iud enjoy the privileges hereunder in place of such 
son's father; but it is expressly understood that blinds 
1111 the shooting grounds of Grantees being used at any 
time by said sons shall be given up to members of the 
Ogden Duck Club upon request. 
In consideration of the feed and grazing benefits 
to be enjoyed and hereby granted by the Ogden Duck 
Club to Grantor or her successors on lands controlled 
by said Ogden Duck Club and its successors in the 
ricinity of lands owned by Grantor, Grantor agrees to 
back up all surplus water of the two creeks running 
through lands of the Grantor above the present dam 
located on the North side of the Northeast quarter of 
said Section 20, and to turn water loose through said 
dam at the pleasure of Grantees. 
This agreement shall be binding upon the heirs 
and assigns of the Grantor and the successors and 
assigns of the Grantees. 
Annie C. Maw 
Gran tor 
OGDEN DUCK CLUB, a Corporation 
Grantee 
By: A. W. Hestmark 
President 
By: W. H. Reeder Jr. 
Secretary 
(Acknowledgment omitted). 
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